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Abstract
This Article examines the European Economic Community’s new procedure for controlling
large-scale mergers in contrast to the existing control procedure under Community cartel law. It
explains these two positions by defining the difference between Concentrative Joint Ventures and
Cooperative Joint Ventures.
EEC MERGER CONTROL:
DISTINGUISHING CONCENTRATIVE
JOINT VENTURES FROM
COOPERATIVE JOINT
VENTURES
Horst-Peter G6tting *
Werner Nikowitz * *
Introduction ............................................ 186
I. The Objectives of Merger Control by Comparison
to the Objectives of Cartel Control ................ 190
A. Substantive Reasons for a Separate Treatment
of M ergers .................................... 190
B. The Notification Procedure under the Merger
Control Regulation ........................... 193
II. The Definition of "Concentration" under the
Merger Control Regulation ........................ 195
III. The Exclusion of "Coordinations" from the Scope
of the Merger Control Regulation ................. 196
IV. Applicability of the Merger Control Regulation to
Joint Ventures ..................................... 196
A . G eneral ....................................... 196
B. Concentration versus Coordination under
German Cartel Law ........................... 198
C. Evaluation of the German Concept of a Partial
Merger and Consequences for EEC
Competition Law ............................. 202
C onclusion ............................................. 204
* Lecturer at the University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany. LL.B.
1980, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany; Dr. jur., 1985, University
of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany; LL.M. 1987, London School of Economics
and Political Science, University of London, England.
* * Associate, Shearman & Sterling, New York, New York. Dr. jur., 1984, Uni-
versity of Vienna, Austria; Mag. rer. soc. oec., 1984, University of Economics in Vi-
enna, Austria; LL.M. 1987, London School of Economics and Political Science, Uni-
versity of London, England.
186 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:185
INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community (the "EEC" or the
"Community") has decided to control large-scale mergers
under a new procedure that will be distinct from the control
procedure under Community cartel law. This may cause diffi-
culties for all share or asset acquisitions that do not clearly fall
within the scope of either merger control or cartel control. In
the absence of clear-cut definitions, hybrid transactions could
end up being notified to the Commission pursuant to concur-
rent Community control procedures.
"Merger control" is conceptually different from "cartel
control." While mergers bring independent corporate entities
under common control and therefore affect competition by
concentrating supply power, cartels' among actual or potential
competitors restrict competition by coordinating competitive be-
havior. Many antitrust laws acknowledge this distinction by
subjecting the two categories to separate treatment. 2 Cartels
are generally prohibited; mergers are generally allowed and
only in exceptional cases prohibited.
There is an additional category of commercial conduct rel-
evant under antitrust laws, the abuse of a dominant position.' The
Treaty of Rome (the "EEC Treaty") prohibits cartels under
1. For the purpose of this Article, the term "cartel" is used in a broad sense to
include any agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted
practices between independent undertakings that have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition and are therefore prohibited by
Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85(1), 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) at 32, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48, as amended by the
Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000, and
as otherwise amended [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. Compare Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1976, Halsbury's Laws of England,
1976 c 34, at 321 (the English cartel prohibitions) with Fair Trading Act of 1973,
Halsbury's Laws of England, 1973 c 41, at 125 (the powers of the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission to assess mergers on public interest grounds). For the distinc-
tion under German law, see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
4. See German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (Act Against Re-
straints of Competition) § 22, as amended by Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 458 (1980) in
the version as published at BGB1 11761 (1980) (current version at BGBI III 703-1
(1980)) [hereinafter German Antitrust Act]. References to German law in this Article
refer to the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.
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Article 85(1) 5 as well as abuses of a dominant position under
Article 866 if they "affect trade between Member States." 7 The
EEC Treaty, however, does not expressly provide for Commu-
nity merger control.8
Nevertheless, over the years the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (the "Court of Justice" or the
"Court"), in supporting a wide interpretation of Articles 859
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32, 298
U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
6. Id. art. 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 33, 298 U.N.T.S. at 48-49.
7. 2 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST:
A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 38.2 (1987 Supp.).
8. Compare EEC Treaty, supra note 1, with Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, art. 66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189),
1, 61-67, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 199-205 (requiring prior authorization by the Commis-
sion for any merger between two undertakings where at least one undertaking is cov-
ered by the ECSC Treaty).
9. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32, 298
U.N.T.S. at 47-48. In BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, the Court held that the
acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competing company may constitute an in-
fringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Joined Cases 142 & 156/84,
1987 E.C.R. 4487, 4575-86, 29-74, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at
17,761-17,766. Philip Morris acquired a direct stake ofjust under 25% of the votes,
but 30.8% of the equity in Rothmans which was a competitor of Philip Morris. Id. at
4569, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,724. The Court reasoned that
because the acquisition "was the subject-matter of agreements entered into by com-
panies which have remained independent after the entry into force of the agree-
ments, the issue must be examined first of all from the point of view of Article 85."
Id. at 4575, 31, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,761. This would suggest
that "full" mergers between two undertakings where the merging companies lose
their independent existence with respect to one another could not be subject to Arti-
cle 85. See Hydrotherm v. Compact (Andreoli), Case 170/83, 1984 E.C.R. 2999,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,112. In BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, the
Court then concluded that "the acquisition by one company of an equity interest in a
competitor does not in itse/f constitute conduct restricting competition." Id. at 4577,
37, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,762 (emphasis added).
However, the acquisition of an equity interest in a competitor might serve as an
"instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question so
as to restrict or distort competition on the market on which they carry on business."
Id. This would be the case in particular where, by acquiring a shareholding or
through subsidiary clauses in the acquisition agreement, the predator company ac-
quires legal or de facto control of the target company's commercial conduct, or
where the acquisition agreement provides for commercial cooperation between the
parties. Id. at 4577, 38, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,762.
Unfortunately, the scope of the judgment is rather unclear since the decision
turns on the rather peculiar fact of a company acquiring a minority stake in a direct
competitor which therefore remained independent (taking into account that the ac-
quired shares represented only a minority interest) but establishing de facto control
through subsidiary clauses (basically a right of first refusal with respect to the transfer
of shares). For a comprehensive analysis of the Philip Morris judgment, see Korah &
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and 86'0 of the EEC Treaty, has allowed the Commission of
the European Communities (the "Commission") to use ex-
isting competition provisions in controlling some mergers and
acquisitions. In an effort to put merger control on a sound
basis, the Commission in 1973 proposed to the Council of
Ministers (the "Council") a specific regulation on merger con-
trol." The Council, however, opposed the proposed regula-
tion, and despite the Commission's willingness to amend the
proposal, the disagreement persisted.
On December 21, 1989, the Council finally adopted a reg-
ulation "on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings" (the "Merger Control Regulation"). 12 The Merger Con-
trol Regulation pre-empts the powers of national antitrust au-
thorities (but not of Member State courts) to assess on
competition grounds' 3 proposed concentrations with "a Com-
Lasok, Philip Morris and its Aftermath - Merger Control?, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 333
(1988). See Mecaniver/PPG, O.J. L 35/54 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,650.
10. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 33, 298
U.N.T.S. at 48-49. Europemballage and Continental Can Co. v. Commission ("Con-
tinental Can Judgment") established that an "abuse of dominant position" prohib-
ited under Article 86 may occur where an undertaking already dominant in the rele-
vant market strengthens that position, for example through a merger or acquisition,
so that the added dominance thereby obtained substantially fetters competition.
Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 225-26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, 8286-8287.
11. Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concen-
trations Between Undertakings, O.J. C 92/1 (1973).
12. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, OJ. L 395/1 (1990) [hereinafter
Merger Control Regulation].
13. Id. recitals 26-27, art. 21(2), at 3, 11. With respect to concentrations falling
under the Merger Control Regulation, Member States' authorities have no power to
(i) approve a concentration disallowed by the Commission, (ii) prevent (on competi-
tion grounds) a concentration found by the Commission to be compatible with the
Common Market-unless the Commission empowers a Member State directly con-
cerned to apply its own competition law to ensure effective competition in a distinct
local market within its territory, or (iii) block (on competition grounds) an anti-com-
petitive concentration approved by the Commission because its general benefits out-
weighed the detriment to competition. For exemptions from the general rule, see id.
recitals 27-28, arts. 9, 21(3), at 3, 7, 11.
Notwithstanding the above, national courts have to apply to any merger agree-
ment Articles 85 or 86 regardless of whether it has been cleared by the Commission
in a merger control procedure because these provisions are directly enforceable as
part of the Member States' law. Pursuant to existing case law, any joint venture
agreement among actual or potential competitors is void under Article 85(1) unless
the Commission has exempted the agreement pursuant to Article 85(3). See infra
note 33 and accompanying text. It is doubtful that a Member State court could inter-
pret a positive Commission decision under the Merger Control Regulation as an ex-
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munity dimension"' 4 and provides the Commission with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all concentrations that fall within the scope
of the Merger Control Regulation.' 5 However, operations that
have as their "object or effect the coordination of the competi-
tive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent" are
not concentrations for the purpose of the Merger Control Reg-
ulation. 16 Such coordinating operations are excluded from the
Merger Control Regulation's scope and continue to be con-
trolled under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. The exclu-
sion of coordinating operations is thereby delineating the ar-
eas of merger control and cartel control.
There is no hard and fast division between concentrations
and share or asset acquisitions having the object or effect of
coordinating competitive behavior. Therefore many transac-
tions appear to fall into both categories. In its Memorandum
on Concentrations in 1966 the Commission conceded that the
distinctions are elusive so that it is hard to say in the abstract
exactly where the dividing line between a cartel and a concen-
tration of enterprises falls.' 7 The Merger Control Regulation,
however, does not offer clear guidelines as to what constitutes
a "coordination" that is excluded from its scope.' 8
The absence of clear guidelines causes special problems
for the future antitrust treatment of joint ventures. Joint ven-
emption pursuant to Article 85(3). This is a disasterous result in practice, frustrating
the objective of a one-stop merger control procedure. See also Hirsch, Member State
Merger Law and Policy in the Wake of the EEC Regulation - A German View, in 1988 FORD-
HAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 27-I (B. Hawk ed. 1989).
14. For the purposes of the Merger Control Regulation, a concentration shall
have a "community dimension" where the following quantitative criteria are met: (i)
the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than
ECU 5 billion (this will possibly be reduced to ECU 2 billion in 1995), (ii) the aggre-
gate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned
is more than ECU 250 million, and (iii) each of the undertakings concerned achieves
more that two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the
same Member State. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 1(2), O.J. L 395/
1, at 3. Other criteria apply to financial institutions. Id. art. 5(3) at 5. See generally Lee
& Robin, One-stop Shopping: Is Brittan on the Right Track?, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 7 (August
1989) (analyzing the anomalies in a Merger Control Regulation).
15. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 21(1), O.J. L 395/1, at 11.
For the definition of "concentration," see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
16. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3(2), OJ. L 395/1, at 4.
17. Comm'n, Le problme de la concentration dans le march6 commun, Collec-
tion Etudes, Serie Concurrence No. 3 (Brussels 1966).
18. But see Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3(2), O.J. L 395/1, at
1989-1990]
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tures resulting in a structure where independent enterprises,
being actual or potential competitors in a certain market,
jointly control a target company, combine elements of concen-
tration and coordination of competitive behavior. Thus, in
some jurisdictions, it has been suggested that joint ventures by
their very nature fall into both categories and are therefore
subject to both merger control and the cartel prohibition.' 9
Community competition law has been greatly influenced
by German cartel law. The distinction between concentrations
and coordinations made in the proposed Merger Control Reg-
ulation closely resembles the distinction developed by German
case law to define the scope of merger control on the one hand
and cartel supervision on the other hand. German case law has
developed the concepts of "coordinative" joint ventures and
'cooperative" joint ventures to distinguish joint ventures that
are subject to merger control from those to be judged under
cartel law aspects.
Anyone proposing to form a joint venture in the Commu-
nity will be faced with the following two questions: First, will
the formation of the joint venture constitute a merger subject
to the new system's notification requirement and control pro-
cedure; and second, will the joint venture agreement infringe
the cartel prohibition and therefore require an exemption
from the cartel prohibition in order to be enforceable? Clarify-
ing the scope of the new EEC merger control instrument with
respect to joint ventures will require some understanding of
the objectives of and the systematic relationship between
merger control and cartel control under EEC competition law.
I. THE OBJECTIVES OF MERGER CONTROL BY'
COMPARISON TO THE OBJECTIVES
OF CARTEL CONTROL
A. Substantive Reasons for a Separate Treatment of Mergers
The Commission believes that dismantling Europe's inter-
nal frontiers will drastically change market conditions within
the Community.20 This trend is conceived to have mainly pro-
19. However, such a "double control" approach seems to be prevented by arti-
cle 3(2) of the Merger Control Regulation, which excludes all coordinative joint ven-
tures from being subject to the Merger Control Regulation. Id. art. 3(2), at 4.
20. Comm'n, Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control
MERGER CONTROL
competitive effects." However, the corporate restructuring
needed to adjust to changing market conditions could lead to
company structures that are too big in relation to the size of
the relevant market. 22
The Commission therefore justifies a separate system of
merger control as follows:
[I]t is .. .necessary to ensure that certain mergers do not
entail lasting damage to competition. The 'danger of this
happening is particularly present in those sectors in which a
small number of firms would dominate the market. As anal-
yses of the development of concentration show, it can also
threaten other sectors particularly if oligopolies with few
competitors of relatively equal size become a prominent
feature of markets within the European Community. A fur-
ther stage, marked by the tightening of existing oligopolies
and the development of individual dominant positions,
could then become discernible.2 3
The Commission shall appraise mergers by examining the fol-
lowing facts affecting competition: the market position and the
economic and financial power of the undertakings concerned;
the suppliers' and users' opportunities of choice to access sup-
plies or markets; the structure of the relevant markets consid-
ering international competition; the legal and factual barriers
to entry into the market; and the supply and demand trends for
the relevant goods or services and the interests of the interme-
diate and ultimate consumers. 24
The Commission will then conclude whether the resulting
supply structure of the market would "create ... a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial
of Concentrations between Undertakings, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(88) 97
final (Apr. 25, 1988), at 1.1 [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1.2; see Adams & Brock, The Bigness Mystique and the Merger Policy Debate:
An International Perspective, 9 NwJ. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 8 (1988) (empirical study analyz-
ing the economic and competitive effect of mergers).
23. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 20, at 1.2.
24. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 2(1), O.J. L 395/1, at 3.
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part" [thereof]." '26 This requires a definition of the relevant
product and geographical markets and an economic assess-
ment of the supply structure resulting from the implementa-
tion of the merger.27
As such, merger control closely resembles the procedure
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty prohibiting an abuse of a
dominant position.2 8 Accordingly, in the Seventeenth Report
on Competition Policy, the Commission identified the objec-
tive of a separate merger control regulation as "to prevent
both the creation, and the enlargement, of dominant market
positions. "29
Moreover, the Merger Control Regulation is based on Ar-
ticles 87 and 235 of the EEC Treaty. 0 This enables the Com-
mission to assess proposed mergers not simply on the basis of
their potential competitive effects but also on whether they
otherwise contribute to the basic objectives of the EEC
Treaty.3 I Thus merger control clearly goes beyond a mere ap-
plication of competition law. 2 Under the auspices of merger
control, the Commission can take into account aspects of in-
dustrial policy and can authorize a merger on the ground that
it would support the development of a new sector of industry
even though it impedes competition in the particular market.
By comparison, the Commission's analysis of coordinative
joint ventures focuses on the question of whether the coopera-
25. "Suiker Unie" UA et al. v. Commission (Sugar Cartel Case), Cases 40-48,
50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8334;
cf. BP v. Commission, Case 77/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1513, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8465.
26. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 2(2), O.J. L 395/1, at 3.
27. See Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 10,340; United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429; Continental Can Judgment, Case 6/72, 1973
E.C.R. 215, 224-26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8286-8287.
28. See B. HAWK, supra note 7, at 660.1-663; V. KORAI, EEC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE 131 (3d ed. 1986). Note, however, that the abuse of a dominant posi-
tion requires the dominant position to be already existing before the implementation
of the merger. See Continental Can Judgment, Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171.
29. Comm'n, Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy, 51 (1987).
30. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 87, 235, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd.
5179-I) at 33, 73, 298 U.N.T.S. at 49, 91.
31. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, recital 13, O.J. L 395/1, at 2.
32. The Merger Control Regulation shall apply to concentrations whether or
not they fall within the scope of Article 85 or 86 of the EEC Treaty.
MERGER CONTROL
tion of the venturers could impede actual or potential competi-
tion among the venturers and between the individual venturers
and the joint venture.33 Maintenance of competition between
parties involved in the transaction is of primary concern and
not, as in the case of concentrations, whether the new entity
resulting from a merger would have a dominant position in re-
lation to the overall competitive structure of the market.
Merger control even presupposes the elimination of competi-
tion among merging entities.34
B. The Notification Procedure under the Proposed
Merger Control Regulation
The finding that a stock or asset purchase agreement is
invalid because it infringes the cartel prohibition is a cumber-
some sanction once the agreement has been put into effect.
The Merger Control Regulation therefore requires all concen-
trations falling within its scope to be notified to the Commis-
sion before being put into effect. 5 All concentrations will
have to be notified to the Commission regardless of whether
they have as "their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market ' 36 or
whether they would result in an abuse of a dominant posi-
tion.37
In comparison, under Council Regulation 17 ("Regulation
17"),38 which implements Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
33. This is sometimes referred to as the "inherent" anti-competitive effect of
joint ventures. The Commission's Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, 55
(1983), marked the beginning of a new line of Commission decisions. See BP/Kellog,
O.J. L 369/6 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,747; Optical Fibres ("Corning
Glass"), O.J. L 236/30 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813; C. BELLAMY & G.
CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 227-28 (3d ed. 1987); Korah, Critical
Comments on the Commission's Recent Decisions Exempting Joint Ventures to Exploit Research
that Needs Further Development, 12 EUR. L. REV. 18 (1987).
34. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3, O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (defini-
tion of "concentration" requires that merging entities become subject to common
control); see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
35. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 4, OJ. L 395/1, at 4-5. For a
discussion of when the Merger Control Regulation applies, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
36. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-33, 298
U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
37. Id. art. 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 33, 298 U.N.T.S. at 48-49; Merger
Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. l(1), O.J. L 395/I, at 3.
38. Premier rbglement d'application des articles 85 et 86 du trait6, Council Reg-
1989-19901
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Treaty, notification is required only if an agreement or con-
certed practice infringes the cartel prohibition of Article 85(1)
of the EEC Treaty and if the parties consequently seek an ex-
emption from the cartel prohibition pursuant to Article 85(3)
of the EEC Treaty.
Once the Commission is notified of an infringing agree-
ment pursuant to Regulation 17, the parties are free to im-
plement the agreement even before the Commission has de-
cided whether to grant an exemption.40 In comparison, the
general rule under the Merger Control Regulation is that con-
centrations may not be implemented until the Commission has
decided whether that concentration is compatible with the
Common Market.4 '
Under the Merger Control Regulation, the Commission
must generally decide within a maximum period of five months
following the date of notification.42 Under Regulation 17, the
Commission is not required to reach a decision within a certain
period of time, and in practice it can take from a few months to
several years until the Commission issues a formal decision.4 3
ulation No. 17/62, 5J.O. 204/62 (1962) (as amended), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87, current English version at Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401 [hereinafter Reg-
ulation 17].
39. Id. art. 4(1), at 206/62, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2431.
40. After proper notification has been made, the Commission cannot impose
fines for infringements of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. Id. art. 15(5)(a), at 210,
O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 92, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2541; see id. art.
15(6), at 210, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 92, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2542.
However, an agreement does not enjoy provisional validity during this period in case
the Commission does not grant an exemption. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin (No. 2),
Case 48/72, 1973 E.C.R. 77, 98-99, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8170, at 8278.
41. The parties' right to close the transaction is automatically suspended for
three weeks. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 7(1), O.J. L 395/1, at 6.
Under Article 7(4) the Commission may grant an exemption from the suspension
requirement to prevent serious damage. Id. art. 7(4), at 6. Thereafter, the Commis-
sion may order a continuation of the suspension until it makes a final decision. Id.
art. 7(2), at 6. Under Article 7(3) of the Merger Control Regulation, the Commission
may grant an exemption from the suspension requirement in the case of a public
takeover or exchange bid that has been notified to the Commission by the date of its
announcement provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights at-
tached to the acquired shares "or does so only to maintain the full value of those
investments" until the merger is approved. Id. art. 7(3), at 6.
42. Id. art. 10, at 8. In case the Commission refers the notified concentration to
the cartel office of a Member State, the decision may be delayed up to seven months
following the date of notification. Id. arts. 9(4)(b), 9(6), at 7.
43. In most cases the Commission terminates a notification procedure by send-
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From a procedural viewpoint, corporate restructurings re-
quire a speedy competition control mechanism well-suited to
providing a higher degree of legal certainty. Regulation 17 is,
therefore, "not well suited to mergers. 44
II. THE DEFINITION OF "CONCENTRATION" UNDER
THE MERGER CONTROL REGULATION
The Merger Control Regulation applies to all "concentra-
tions" having a "Community dimension."4 5 A "concentra-
tion" shall be "deemed to arise" where two or more previously
independent undertakings merge4 6 and, thus, become a single
corporate entity, or where "one or more undertakings acquire,
whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by
any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or
parts of one or more other undertakings. 47
"Control" can be obtained either through the acquisition
of voting shares or through the creation of contractual rights
that factually make it possible to exercise decisive influence on
the target.48 Thus, the establishment of ajoint venture among
separate entities will constitute a "concentration" if one or
more venturers acquire or establish a controlling interest in a
separate corporate entity that will carry out a joint venture pro-
ing "comfort letters" stating that from the facts in its possession, the agreement
either does not infringe Article 85(1) or merits exemption according to Article 85(3)
of the EEC Treaty. The disadvantage of this practice is that such comfort letters,
being only informal statements of the Commission's opinion, do not bind national
courts. While a negative clearance should at least be taken into account by national
courts when deciding on the validity of a contract, the statement that the agreement
merits exemption may even prove to be counterproductive as it implies that the con-
tract falls within the prohibition of Article 85(l). This is troublesome because na-
tional courts have no power to grant an exemption. See V. KORAH, supra note 28, at
37-38.
44. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 20, at 1.4.
45. See supra note 14.
46. Merger Control, Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3(l)(a), O.J. L 395/1, at 4.
47. Id. art. 3(1)(b), at 4. Persons, undertakings, or groups of persons or under-
takings that may acquire "control" include those which "(a) are holders of the rights
or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned, or (b) while not being holders of
such rights or entitled to rights under such contracts, have the power to exercise the
rights deriving therefrom." Id. art. 3(4), at 4.
48. Id. art. 3(3), at 4. In particular, "control" is achieved by "(a) ownership or
the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking [or] (b) rights or contracts
which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs
of an undertaking." Id.
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ject. Furthermore, the establishment of a joint venture by way
of a partnership or cooperation arrangement will be a "con-
centration" if at least one venturer acquires joint control of, or
a right to use, all or part of the assets of a partner.
III. THE EXCLUSION OF "COORDINATIONS" FROM THE
SCOPE OF THE MERGER CONTROL
REGULATION
Transactions bringing about or intending to bring about a
coordination of competitive behavior among separate under-
takings are expressly excluded from the scope of the Merger
Control Regulation even if they would otherwise constitute a
"concentration." 49  "Coordinations" are not subject to the
Merger Control Regulation but shall be examined pursuant to
Regulation 1750 or under the other regulations implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.5 '
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE MERGER CONTROL
REGULATION TO JOINT VENTURES
A. General
A joint venture can briefly be characterized for the pur-
pose of this discussion as a cooperation agreement between
two or more separate undertakings under which each party is
obliged to make a substantial contribution to the implementa-
tion of a common project, usually in the field of research and
development of new products. 2 The joint venture exists as a
separate business and usually also as a separate legal entity but
is jointly owned and controlled by the parent undertakings.53
If one person alone or more persons jointly acquire a con-
49. The Merger Control Regulation provides that "[a]n operation, including the
creation of a joint venture, which has as its object or effect the coordination of the
competitive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent shall not consti-
tute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph I (b)" of the Merger Control
Regulation. Id. recital 23, art. 3(2), at 2, 4.
50. Regulation 17, supra note 38.
51. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, recital 23, O.J. L 395/1, at 2.
52. See C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note 33, at chapter 5. EEC antitrust law
does not use the term "joint venture" as a defined legal concept. The term "joint
venture," however, is used in article 5(2) of the block exemption for patent licensing
agreements. Comm'n Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15 (1984).
53. C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note 33, at 194; Brodley, Joint Ventures and
Anti-Trust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1982).
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trolling influence over the shares or the whole or parts of the
assets of ajoint venture, that acquisition will be considered as a
"concentration '5 4 subject to the Merger Control Regulation.
However, if a joint venture has as its "principal object or effect
the coordination of the competitive behaviour" of independ-
ent undertakings it will not be a "concentration" and will
therefore be excluded from the scope of the Merger Control
Regulation; instead it will be subject to investigation under Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. It is therefore necessary to
develop reliable criteria to distinguish concentrative joint ven-
tures, which have to be notified under the Merger Control
Regulation, from coordinative joint ventures, which are ex-
cluded from the scope of the Merger Control Regulation and
possibly have to be notified for an exemption from the cartel
prohibition.
Any joint venture agreement involves a certain amount of
"coordination" of the activities of the engaged parties. To
make the cooperation vital, the participants usually agree upon
a number of obligations and restrictions "coordinating" their
competitive relationship. For example, in consideration for
the basic obligation to make a substantial technological or fi-
nancial contribution to the operation of the joint venture, the
joint venture agreement usually imposes restrictions upon
each party's right to conduct its own research in the joint ven-
ture's sphere, or to exploit unilaterally the partner's know-how
or the results of the joint venture.5 5 The Commission there-
fore assumes that the partners of a joint venture coordinate
their competitive behavior in one way or another when finding
that all joint ventures between actual or potential competitors
are automatically caught by Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.56
This "cartel aspect" could suggest that all joint ventures are
"coordinations" that are outside the scope of the Merger Con-
trol Regulation. On the other hand, a joint venture usually
54. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3, O.J. L 395/1, at 4.
55. See Comm'n Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, O.J. L
53/5 (1985); C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note 33, at 198; B. HAWK, supra note 7, at
250.
56. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; B. HAWK, supra note 7, at 249 (re-
ferring to GEC-Wier Sodium Circulators, OJ. L 327/26 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,000).
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also contains "concentrative" elements insofar as some of the
parent's activities are partly pooled in a new business activity.5 7
In some jurisdictions 5s this "double nature" of joint ven-
tures has lent support to the view that joint ventures are sub-
ject to both merger control and cartel control. It must be wel-
comed that such a "parallelism" in the assessment ofjoint ven-
tures is precluded under EEC antitrust law by (i) the reciprocal
exclusion of the concepts of "concentrations" and "coordina-
tions" in article 3 of the Merger Control Regulation 59 in con-
junction with (ii) the principle of exclusive application of the
Merger Control Regulation to concentrations falling within its
scope.60 Thus, as a matter of law, the formation of ajoint ven-
ture will either be subject to merger control or to cartel con-
trol but shall not be subject to both review procedures.6 '
B. Concentration versus Coordination under German Cartel Law
Regarding the antitrust treatment of joint ventures, Ger-
man law distinguishes "concentrative" from "cooperative"
joint ventures. The distinction defines the scope of the merger
control provision of section 23 of the German Antitrust Act
6 2
in relation to the cartel prohibition of section 1 of that act.
If several enterprises simultaneously or successively ac-
quire shares of at least 25% or 50% of the voting capital of
another enterprise, that enterprise is considered a "joint ven-
ture" (Gemeinschaftsunternehmen) and as such subject to merger
control.63 This is based on the theory that the formation of a
joint venture is deemed to constitute a merger between, first,
the joint venture and each parent company holding at least
25% of the shares of the joint venture, and second, between
57. See Temple Lang,Joint Ventures under the EEC Treaty Rules on Competition H, 13
IRISH JURIST 132, 133 (1978).
58. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. This is also the situation in the
United States. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964)
(applying both section 1 of Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), and section 7 of
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988) to joint ventures).
59. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3, OJ. L 395/1, at 4.
60. Id. art. 22, at 11-12.
61. See supra note 13.
62. German Antitrust Act, supra note 4, § 23. For an English translation of the
German Antitrust Act, see R. MULLER, M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, GERMAN AN-
TITRUST LAW 85, 185 (1984) and F. BEIER, G. SCHRICKER & W. FIKENTSCHER, GERMAN
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS 169-79 (1983).
63. German Antitrust Act, supra note 4, § 23(2).
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the individual parent companies. 61 Mergers are subject to
merger control and must be reported to the Federal Cartel Of-
fice if they meet certain quantitative tests regarding market
shares, number of employees, and turnover.6 5
The fact that the German Antitrust Act explicitly provides
for merger control of joint ventures gives rise to the question
as to whether these merger control provisions are exclusive
and exhaustive or whether joint ventures are also subject to
review under the general clause of section 1 of the German
Antitrust Act prohibiting horizontal restraints of competi-
tion.6 6
The relationship between the merger control provisions
and the cartel prohibition for examining joint ventures has
been a matter of controversy among competition lawyers for
64. R. MULLER, M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 85-86.
65. German Antitrust Act, supra note 4, § 23(1). A merger shall immediately be
reported to the Federal Cartel Office if:
- it results in, or increases a previously existing market share of at least 20
per cent in any market within the Federal Republic of Germany or a sub-
stantial part thereof
- or a participating enterprise has a share of at least 20 per cent in any
other market within the Federal Republic of Germany
- or the participating enterprises collectively had at any time during the
fiscal year preceding the merger at least 10,000 employees or a turnover
of at least DM500 million.
R. MOLLER, M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 88 (translating § 23(1)
of German Antitrust Act); see F. BEIER, G. SCHRICKER & W. FIKENTSCHER, supra note
62, at 178-79. Pursuant to section 24 of the German Antitrust Act, the Federal Cartel
Office must prohibit mergers that are anticipated to result in or reinforce a market
dominating position. German Antitrust Act, supra note 4, § 24. Pre-merger notifica-
tion has to be given to the Federal Cartel Office if:
- one of the enterprises participating in the merger had [worldwide] turn-
over proceeds of at least two thousand million Deutsche Marks during
the last preceding business year; or
- at least two of the enterprises participating in the merger had each turn-
over proceeds of one thousand million Deutshe Marks or more during
the last preceding business year; or
- if the merger, pursuant to state law, is to be effected by legislative enact-
ment or by other sovereign act.
R. MOLLER, M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 201 (translating
§ 24(a) of German Antitrust Act).
66. German Antitrust Act, supra note 4, § 1. According to the cartel prohibition
of section 1 of the German Antitrust Act, all agreements between undertakings or
associations of undertakings having the purpose or the effect of influencing produc-
tion or market conditions with respect to trade in goods or commercial services by
restraining competition are void. Id.
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many years.67 There is now a consensus that the relevant
merger control provisions do not generally exclude the appli-
cation of the cartel prohibition of section 1 of the German An-
titrust Act to joint ventures. 68 The opposite view would lead to
the unacceptable result wherein joint ventures not meeting the
thresholds test of section 23(1) of the German Antitrust Act
would completely escape antitrust control even if those joint
ventures involve serious restraints of competition. 69 Apart
from that common ground, opinions are divided over the ex-
tent to which the cartel prohibition applies to joint ventures.
According to one view, which can be characterized as the
"double control" approach, all kinds ofjoint ventures are sub-
ject to an investigation under both the merger control provi-
sions and the cartel prohibition. 70 However, most scholars re-
ject this view71 mainly on the grounds that such a parallelism
would lead to inconsistent results because. the standards of ap-
praisal of merger control and cartel control are different in
substance and effect.7 2 While merger control is mainly based
on quantitative criteria constituting dominance, the cartel pro-
hibition condemns all agreements having an appreciable effect
on competition regardless of the market power of the parties
involved. Furthermore, the cartel prohibition, which nullifies
any contract that restricts competition, may be invoked by
competitors without any time limit, even if the Federal Cartel
Office has cleared an agreement on the basis of the merger
control provisions.
In order to avoid conflict between the two norms and
avoid the practical problems resulting from the "double con-
trol" approach, a distinction between "concentrative" and "co-
operative" joint ventures has been developed 7 3 to draw a line
67. See infra notes 73-74.
68. Id.
69. See Beuthien, Gesellschaftsrecht und Kartellrecht (1), 1978 DER BETRIEB 1625;
Gritzner, Projektgemeinschaften ohne Fusionkontrolle, 1978 WuW 193; Harms, Fusionkon-
trolle. Praxis, Novellierungspldne und kritische Wurdigung, 1976/77 FIW, Heft 81, at 43-47;
see also Huber, Gemeinschaftsunternehmen im deutschen und europaischen Weltbewerbsrecht,
1978 FIW, Heft 80, at 132-33.
70. V. EMMERICH, KARTELLRECHT 350 (1988); Koch, Kartellverbot und Fusionskon-
trolle, in 1974 WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 30.
71. See infra notes 73-74.
72. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
73. See Beniscfi, Das Gemeinschaftsunternehmen in der zweiten Kartellgesetznovelle, 1972
FESTSCHRIFT FOR KAUFMANN 73, 79; see also H. KOHLER, WETrBERWER-
MERGER CONTROL
between the ambits of merger control and the cartel prohibi-
tion. Accordingly, "concentrative" joint ventures are subject
only to the merger control provisions, whereas "cooperative"
joint ventures fall within the scope of the cartel prohibition.74
This approach is based on the theory that section 23 of the
German Antitrust Act establishes a fiction of a partial merger
between the joint venture partners that is only justified in cases
where the elements of concentration prevail.
After a period of uncertainty, the concept of cooperative
versus coordinative joint ventures is now well established in
German cartel law. It was adopted in the guidelines of the
Federal Cartel Office7" and was upheld by the German Federal
Supreme Court in a decision in 1985.76
The discussion among German competition lawyers now
focuses on defining the notions of "concentrative" and "coop-
erative" joint ventures. According to the guidelines of the
Federal Cartel Office, a joint venture is to be considered as
"concentrative" if: (1) the joint venture is a functioning under-
taking in the sense that it possesses all the attributes of a sepa-
rate undertaking; (2) the joint venture makes market-related
performances and does not exclusively or prevailingly fulfill
auxiliary functions for the parents on an upstream or down-
stream level; and (3) the parent companies do not, or cease to,
engage in the market area covered by the joint venture.77
Provided these conditions are met, the joint venture con-
stitutes a so-called "partial merger." As such, it enjoys a so-
called "merger privilege" to the effect that the cartel prohibi-
SBESCHRANKUNGEN DURCH NACHFRAGER 134 (1977); Leube, Zur Anwendbarkeit der §§ 1
und 23f. GWB aufGemeinschaftsunternehmen, 141 ZHR 313, 322 (1977); Ulmer, Gemein-
same Tochtergesellschaften im deutschen Konzern- und Wettbewerbsrecht, 141 ZHR 466, 473
(1977); Lanzenberger, Praxis der Fusionskontrolle, in Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts, 1975/
76 FIW, Heft 77, at 53, 57.
74. See Bechthold, Zur Fusionkontrolle ziber Gemeinschaftsunternehmen, 1980 BE-
TRIEBS-BERATER 344; Kn6pfle, Zur Unterscheidung zwischen konzentrativem und koopera-
tivem Gemeinschaftsunternehmen bei der kartellrechtlichen Beurteilung von Gemeinschaft-
sgrindungen, 1980 BETRIEBS-BERATER 654; see also WIEDEMANN, GEMEINSCHAFTSUN-
TERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHT 107, 122, 139 (1981); Ebel, Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, KARTELLRECHTSKOMMENTAR § 23, 22 n.40 (1988).
75. German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt), Report 1978, at 23.
76. German Federal Supreme Court, 96 BGHZ 69, at 78 (Oct. 1, 1985); see
Court of Appeals of Frankfurt, 1989 WuW/E OLG 4323 (Dec. 1, 1988) (following
the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court).
77. German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt), Report 1985/86, at 63.
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tion of section 1 of the German Antitrust Act does not apply.
The merger privilege is limited to the formation of the joint
venture and extends to the competitive restraints ancillary or
necessary thereto," such as non-competition clauses indispen-
sable to the parties entering into the joint venture agreement.
The German Federal Supreme Court summarized the nature
of a "concentrative" joint venture as follows:
[T]he essential feature of a concentrative joint venture is to
be seen in the fact that it represents an independent busi-
ness entity, planning, determining and implementing its ac-
tivities.on its own responsibility, whereas the parent compa-
nies are basically confined to exercising their voting rights
deriving from their shareholdings. 79
In such independently managed joint ventures, operating
in a separate market, the elements of concentration prevail
over concerns that the cooperation might restrict competition
between the partners. The formation of the joint venture is
therefore regarded as a partial merger which is exclusively sub-
ject to merger control.
C. Evaluation of the German Concept of a Partial Merger and
Consequences for EEC Competition Law
The German "partial merger" concept does not provide a
ready solution for the difficult problem of applying the appro-
priate antitrust procedure to a particular joint venture. How-
ever, by avoiding the unsatisfactory consequences of the
"double control" approach, the partial merger concept estab-
lishes distinctive criteria that improve the legal certainty poten-
tial venturers need.80
The distinction between "concentrative" and "coopera-
tive" joint ventures has been criticized as imprecise and
vague.8 ' Nevertheless, this "weakness" is not due to the theo-
retical concept; instead, it is caused by the complexity of joint
venture agreements which make assessments on a case-by-case
basis inevitable.
78. For a discussion of the "ancillary restraints" doctrine under EEC law, see B.
HAWK, supra note 7, at 255.
79. German Federal Supreme Court, 96 BGHZ at 78 (Oct. 1, 1985) (translation
provided by author); see Court of Appeals of Frankfurt, 1989 WuW/E OLG at 4324.
80. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81. For this criticism, see V. EMMERICH, supra note 70,,at 350.
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The German partial merger theory greatly resembles the
partial merger theory that the Commission has used in various
instances.8 2 The Commission's partial merger theory which
presumably derived from the partial merger concept estab-
lished under German cartel law provides that the formation of
a joint venture is to be treated as a "concentration" escaping
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty if: (1) the partners have trans-
ferred a complete business to the joint venture and not merely
a particular function thereof (such as research and develop-
ment, buying or selling);83 (2) as a result, the parents have per-
manently and irreversibly abandoned business in the field of
the joint venture;" (3) thejoint venture is under a single man-
agement so that the parents become pure holding compa-
nies;8 5 and (4) there is no way in which the joint venture might
affect competition between the parents in other areas.
In the absence of a separate system of merger control
under EEC competition law, the partial merger theory has
been criticized as unsatisfactory. 87 The Merger Control Regu-
lation will put the partial merger theory into new perspective
and allow it to fulfill its proper function. In the past the ques-
tion was whether joint ventures fall within Article 85 of the
EEC Treaty or escape antitrust control altogether. 88 The ques-
tion now will be whether a joint venture is subject to Article 85
of the EEC Treaty or the Merger Control Regulation.
Adopting the partial merger theory as the necessary crite-
rion of distinction between concentrations and coordinations
in the case of joint ventures seems to follow from a coherent
82. See SHV/Chevron, O.J. L 38/14 (1975), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9709;
Comm'n, Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, 26 (1986); Comm'n, Sixth Re-
port on Competition Policy, 55 (1977); see also C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note
33, at 435; Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law and Joint Ventures Involving
Transfer of Technology, in 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 203, 267 (B. Hawk ed. 1983);
Temple Lang, supra note 57, at 132. See generally B. HAWK, supra note 7, at 260 (dis-
cussing the application of Article 85 to partial mergers within the Community).
83. Comm'n, Sixth Report on Competition Policy, 54 (1977).
84. See SHV/Chevron, O.J. L 38/14 (1975), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9709.
85. Comm'n, Sixth Report on Competition Policy, 55 (1977).
86. Id. This antitrust concern is sometimes referred to as the "spill-over effect"
of joint ventures.
87. See Temple Lang, supra note 57, at 140.
88. Joint ventures did not escape antitrust control if they constituted an abuse of
a dominant position prohibited under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. See supra note
10.
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interpretation of the second paragraph of article 3(2) of the
Merger Control Regulation which provides that
[t]he creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting ba-
sis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity,
which does not give rise to coordination of the competitive
behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between
them and the joint venture, shall constitute a concentration
within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b) [of the Merger Con-
trol Regulation]."9
Thus, all joint ventures meeting the Commission's criteria
of a partial merger are "concentrative" joint ventures90 and
will have to be notified to the Commission pursuant to the
Merger Control Regulation. They will be exclusively subject
to merger control. This is true even if ancillary restrictions ex-
ist.9 All other, "cooperative"joint ventures will be exclusively
subject to review under Regulation 17.
CONCLUSION
The Merger Control Regulation applies to concentrations
and excludes from its scope operations having the objective or
effect of coordinating competitive behavior between independ-
ent undertakings. It will be difficult to identify clearly a share
or asset acquisition establishing a joint venture as being either
a pure concentration or a coordination.
German cartel law has developed the concept of a "partial
merger" to distinguish joint ventures subject to merger con-
trol from those subject to cartel control. The partial merger
concept was also introduced into EEC competition law, but has
been criticized as unsatisfactory and dubious because it did not
fit into an antitrust law system without a separate procedure to
control mergers. Based on a coherent interpretation of article
3(2) of the Merger Control Regulation and taking into account
the objectives of the new Merger Control Regulation, the par-
tial merger theory will be the criterion by which to distinguish
concentrative joint ventures exclusively subject to merger con-
trol from cooperative joint ventures to which Article 85 of the
EEC Treaty will be applicable.
89. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3(2), OJ. L 395/1, at 4.
90. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
91. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 12, recital 25, OJ. L 395/1, at 3.
